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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
AFFIDAVIT FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF A DISTRICT JUDGE FOR IMPUTED
BIAS IN A CRIMINAL CASE NOT TIMELY AFTER VERDICT.-In a trial in the
district court defendants were found guilty of murder in the second de-
gree. Defendants moved for a new trial, and a hearing ol the motion
was set for December 19. The state requested additional time, and the
hearing on the motion for a new trial was reset for January 16, and then
for January 21. On January 6 the county attorney filed an affidavit of
disqualification of the district judge, giving as his reasons that the judge
was biased and prejudiced. One day later, a motion to quash the affidavit
was filed by counsel for the defendants. The latter motion was sustained
at a hearing before another district judge on February 13. On February
27, the county attorney filed a motion requesting the district judge to
disqualify himself for actual bias and prejudice. This motion was denied
and ordered stricken from the records. The county attorney then peti-
tioned the Supreme Court of Montana for a Writ of Prohibition. Held:
Writ denied. The court found the allegations of actual bias and prejudice
insufficient to disqualify the district judge. Interpreting the statute pro-
viding for the disqualification of a district judge for imputed bias and
prejudice in criminal cases,' the court stated that the affidavit filed Janu-
ary 6, after return of the jury verdict, and after the date originally set for
the hearing on the motion for a new trial, but prior to the hearing of such
motion, was not timely. State v. District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial
District, 393 P.2d 39 (Mont. 1964).
At common law the bases for the disqualification of a judge were a
relationship between the judge and one interested in the case within a
certain degree, or a direct, certain and immediate pecuniary interest in the
outcome of the suit.2 Bias or prejudice on the part of a judge which was
not the result of such relationship or interest theoretically did not exist.
Thus, absent constitutional or statutory provisions, bias and prejudice
could not operate to disqualify a judge from trying a case. Many juris-
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-6913. This statute provides in part:
A district judge must not sit or act as such in any criminal action or pro-
ceeding when either party makes and files an affidavit, as hereinafter provided,
that he has reason to believe, and does believe, he cannot have a fair and im-
partial hearing or trial before a district judge by reason of the bias and prej-
udice of such judge. Such affidavit may be made by any party to the criminal
action, motion or proceeding, personally, or by his attorney or guardian and shall
be filed with the clerk of the district court in which the same may be pending,
at least fifteen days prior to the trial of said cause, or any retrial thereof after
appeal. Upon the filing of the affidavit, the judge, as to whom said disqualifi
cation is averred, shall be without authority to act further in the criminal action,
motion or proceeding, but the provisions of this section do not apply to the
arrangement of the calendar, the regulation of the order of business, the power
of transferring the criminal action or proceeding to some other court, nor to
the power of calling in another district judge to sit and act in such criminal
action or proceeding, providing that no judge shall so arrange the calendar as
to defeat the purposes of this section. Not more than one judge can be disquali-
fied for bias and prejudice, in said criminal action or proceeding, at the instance
of the prosecution and not more than one judge at the instance of the defendant
or defendants. Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA will be cited as R.C.M.
2State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co. et al., 157 Kan. 622, 143 P.2d 652, 654
(1943).
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dictions now recognize that bias and prejudice may arise from other fac-
tors, and that a person is not necessarily immnme to those influences
merely because he is a member of the judiciary. If a fair and impartial
trial is to be held, the judge must be free from bias and prejudice regard-
less of its source. Constitutional and statutory provisions forbidding a
judge so influenced to act are designed not only for the protection of
parties, but are also in the general interests of society. By preserving the
purity and impartiality of the courts, the public's respect and confidence
in judicial decisions is fostered.3
Three general methods of disqualification are utilized under various
statutes :' (1) By a determination on the facts as to the existence of bias
on the part of the judge, usually made by the judge himself, and subject
to appeal.5 (2) By affidavit submitted by the aggrieved party alleging
facts which give rise to the assertion of bias. The judge passes on the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit. If it is sufficient on its face, the judge is
disqualified without inquiring whether the allegations of bias are true
or false. To be legally sufficient, the facts stated must be such that a
reasonable mind might fairly infer bias.6 (3) Where disqualification is
effective on the mere assertion of bias, without regard to the facts. Under
this approach the theory is that since prejudice is a state of mind, it is
often difficult to attribute it to any specific facts. Disqualification in
such a manner is based on the belief that the courts should be above even
the suspicion of partiality. This is the method allowed by Montana's civil
and criminal disqualification statutes.7
The appropriate time to apply for the disqualification of a judge,
using any of the methods, varies with the statutory authority of the dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Generally, the disqualification must be sought at
some specified time before trial, or as soon as the identity of the judge
who will preside becomes known," or as soon as the facts which give
rise to the allegations of bias become known." A delay in presenting the
objection after the party is aware of the facts constituting the alleged
bias, may be considered as a waiver of the right.'0 A party should not be
allowed to delay in seeking the disqualification, gamble on a favorable
decision, and then raise objection if he is disappointed in the result."
A tenuous term at best, "bias" is incapable of precise application to
different individuals, on any given set of facts. Bias refers to a state of
mind, or a preconceived opinion, which would prevent a judge from exer-
'Castleberry v. Jones, Judge, 68 Okla. Crim. 414, 99 P.2d 174 (1940).
4ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROMi ARREST To APPEAL 373 (1947).
'28 U.S.C. § 455 (1958).
'28 U.S.C. § 144 (1958).
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-901 provides for disqualification in civil cases, and R.C.M. 1947, §
94-6913 provides for disqualification in criminal cases.
'Wolf v. Marshall, 120 Ohio St. 216, 165 N.E. 848 (1929).
'State ex rel. La Baw v. Sommer, 237 Ind. 393, 146 N.E.2d 420 (1957).
"ONebgen v. State, 47 Ohio App. 431, 192 N.E. 130 (1933).
"Rohr v. Johnson, 65 Cal. App. 2d 208, 150 P.2d 5 (1944).
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cising his function impartially in a particular case. A substantial problem
exists in determining, with any certainty, what constitutes a state of mind
that would render a judge unable to impartially fulfill the duties of his
office. It involves an evaluation of the character of the individual judge,
in relation to his own peculiarities and the circumstances of the case.
This problem is complicated further because, in theory at least, one of the
criteria for the selection of judges is a reduced susceptibility to bias.
There may exist in some members of the judiciary a reluctance to find
this "fault" in one of their own, especially in an area where there must
necessarily be so much doubt. The cases bear witness to the difficulty in
establishing bias to disqualify a judge.12
By allowing disqualification for "imputed bias," hesitancy to find
actual bias is no longer a problem. The term imputed bias refers to a
situation where the mere assertion by the challenging party that he can-
not have a fair trial before a particular judge because of the judge's bias,
is sufficient to disqualify that judge. Rather than being exclusive of
actual bias, it seems to be a procedural device to avoid the fine distinc-
tions and limitations which are drawn by the decisions involving dis-
qualifications for actual bias. The essence of this liberal method of dis-
qualification is that no inquiry is made into the facts supporting the affi-
davit alleging bias. 13
In the statute involved in the instant case, there is no mention of
the term "imputed bias." It states: "Upon the filing of the affidavit, the
judge, as to whom said disqualification is averred, shall be without
authority to act further in the criminal action, motion or proceeding ... " '14
"In a criminal action, after counsel for the defendant had exercised a peremptory chal-
lenge of a juror, the judge apologized to the juror for the attorney's insinuations
and admonished him when he took exception to the judge's remarks: "Your stand-
ing before these courts Mr .......... is not such to entitle you to any great con-
sideration.'' On appeal of the conviction there was a "total failure on the part of
appellant to set forth facts which, if true, would show bias or prejudice of the trialjudge." People v. Emmett, 123 Cal. App. 678, 12 P.2d 92, 93 (1932).
In a negligence action, after the verdict and before the defendant had moved for
a new trial, the judge had written to both counsel that it was his belief that such
a motion would have more than usual merit, that it was hard to believe the jury's
conclusion that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, and that the amount
of damages required further consideration. The judge was not disqualified from
hearing the arguments on the motion for a new trial, under a procedure allowing
disqualification at this point. Wampler v. Muller, 121 Cal. App. 2d 396, 262 P.2d
853 (1953).
If the state of mind of the trial judge is adverse to one of the parties, "but
is based upon actual observance of the witnesses and the evidence given during the
trial of the action, it does not amount to that prejudice against a litigant which dis-
qualifies him in the trial of the action." People v. Yeager, 10 Cal. Rptr. 829, 359
P.2d 261 (1961).
In addition to illustrating the difficulty of adequately establishing a state
of mind necessary to disqualify, such cases as these must leave some doubt in the
minds of litigants and the public as to the impartiality of the courts.
"This method of disqualification is subject to abuse by allowing the disqualification
to be effective for reasons which would not be considered as ''disqualifying bias''
if passed upon by the courts. It could also be used merely as a device to avoid an
expected adverse ruling by the court, or simply to gain additional time. Although
such abuse could be a serious problem, it was not mentioned by the court in the
instant case.
IR.C.M. 1947, § 94-6913.
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Similar wording, in the civil disqualification statute,15 has been inter-
preted to mean that mere filing of the affidavit ipso facto works the
disqualification of the judge against whom it is directed.16 The imputa-
tion of bias in the affidavit may simply be stated in the language of the
statute, and proof of facts showing actual bias and prejudice is neither
required nor permitted.'
7
The Supreme Court of Montana has interpreted the civil disqualifi-
cation statute to mean that an affidavit filed between the verdict and the
hearing on the motion for a new trial is timely. In the case of State ex
rel. Carleton v. District Court'8 the court said that only by such an inter-
pretation could the words "action, motion and proceeding" have distinct
meaning in the statute. The court reasoned that the over all purpose of
the statute, which is that a litigant should have a fair and impartial
adjudication of his rights, demands that a judge not sit when biased or
prejudiced. Limitations within the statute prevent the disqualification
from being invoked during a hearing, yet the disqualification may be
granted before the hearing upon any one of the steps taken in the progress
of the case, including the hearing on the motion for a new trial.' 9
In the criminal statute, the timing requirement for exercising dis-
qualification is set out: "and shall be filed ... at least fifteen days prior to
the trial of said cause, or any retrial thereof after appeal. '20 This timing
requirement could be considered a procedural technicality, for the con-
venience of scheduling cases, rather than a limitation of the substantive
right granted by the statute. In setting out the right, the statute refers
to "hearing or trial" and "action, motion or proceeding." The time for
filing refers only to "trial" or "retrial." To give effect other than mere
surplusage to the words used in granting the right, the time recited for
the exercise of the right should not control the right itself. In view of
the similarity in wording and purpose of the civil and criminal statutes,
there would be considerable merit in a liberal interpretation of the timing
requirement in the criminal statute, thereby allowing disqualification
before hearings, motions or proceedings, as well as before trial or retrial.
In the instant case, the decision could have been based on the narrow
ground that an affidavit filed after the date originally set for the hearing
on the motion for a new trial was not timely. It will be remembered that
the hearing was originally set for December 19, and at the State's re-
quest was subsequently reset first for January 16, and then for January
21. The affidavit was filed January 6. Such a holding would have been
consistent with the interpretation given to the civil disqualification
'1R.C.M. 1947, § 93-901.
'6In re Woodside-Florence Irrigation Dist., 121 Mont. 346, 194 P.2d 241 (1948).
17State ex rel. Grogan v. District Court, 44 Mont. 72, 119 Pac. 174 (1911).
1833 Mont. 138, 82 Pac. 789 (1905).
lid. at 144, 82 Pac. at 791.
OR.C.M. 1947, § 94-6913.
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statute. In the case of State ex rel. Jacobs v. District Court2' the Mon-
tana Supreme Court said that the date originally set for the hearing is to
be used to determine the time for filing the affidavit.
Instead of utilizing the above suggested approach, the court chose to
base its decision regarding the appropriate time to file the affidavit on the
much broader ground of the differences between civil and criminal
actions. It said that the human rights, life and liberty involved in the
criminal trial make it desirable to retain the judge who has gained some
insight from the trial to aid in the final disposition of the case.22 Thus,
it held that the right to disqualify a judge for imputed bias should be
restricted to the period before "trial" or "retrial." The court looked to
the situation that would arise if, after disqualification after verdict, a new
trial was not granted, and particularly discussed the function of the trial
judge in the sentencing process. In this situation, the substituted judge
would have to impose sentence without having presided at the trial. In
a criminal action it is important to both the accused and society that the
sentence be determined in light of the circumstances of the case and the
individual involved. It is felt that a judge who has presided at the trial
is in a better position to impose sentence than a judge who did not have
the personal contact of the trial.23
It is submitted that implicit in the court's reasoning is an evaluation
of the statute itself. If bias and prejudice would preclude a fair trial,
then the right to disqualify a biased judge would be fundamental to our
society in the protection of human rights. The court evidently weighed
the relative merits of allowing disqualification for "imputed bias" after
the trial against the benefits to be derived through retention of the trial
judge. It apparently decided that justice is better served by the latter.
The criminal disqualification statute was enacted after many years of
experience with its civil counterpart, and with interpretation of the civil
statute by the court in view. However, the differences in the language
of Pthe two statutes are not such as would indicate a legislative intent
contrary to the interpretation given the civil statute in the Carleton
case. 24 In adopting the criminal statute, the legislature must have deter-
mined that a need for relief from the evils of a hearing before a prejudiced
judge exists, and that the method of imputing bias to the judge was the
'48 Mont. 410, 138 Pac. 1091 (1914). But see Mead v. Mead, 134 Mont. 391, 332 P.2d
499 (1958), which, while reaching a different result, is seemingly distinguishable
on the facts.
'Instant case at 42.
'The court mentioned several statutes which vest the trial judge with some discretion
in the sentencing process. According to R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7411, the jury may assess
the punishment or leave the same to the court. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7412 states that
where the jury does not assess the punishment, the court must fix the punishment.
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7415 says that the court has the power to reduce the extent or
duration, if the jury fixes the punishment. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7821 provides that
the court may suspend the execution of sentence.
Supra note 18.
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most desirable means of affording this protection.?' If the bias and
prejudice of judges in fact constitutes a serious problem, then, to give
maximum effect to the object of the statute, and to promote substantial
justice, the disqualification should be allowed before any of the separate
stages in the progress of the case.
LAWRENCE H. SVERDRUP.
REASONABLE MISTAKE AS TO THE AGE OF THE PROSECUTRIX IS AN AF-
FIRiATIVE DEFENSE TO A CHARGE OF STATUTORY RAPE.-The defendant was
charged and convicted of the offense of statutory rape.' On appeal to
the California Supreme Court, held, reversed. Proof of a reasonable belief
that the female was older than the statutory age constituted a defense to
the charge. People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964).
Before the instant case the unanimous rule in the United States was
that mistake of the female's age did not constitute a defense to the crime
of statutory rape. Defenses such as a good faith belief that the prose-
cutrix was above the prohibited age, 2 that the defendant had exercised
reasonable care to ascertain her age, or that he was misled by the girl's
appearance or misrepresentations were not available.3 The Montana Su-
preme Court, in dictum, has concurred with this rule.
4
'Where such a statute is interpreted as allowing disqualification for imputed bias
and prejudice, or peremptory challenge, a constitutional problem may arise. In the
instant case the court recognized this possibility, but said that this matter was not
properly before the court. This question is now before the court, in regard to the
civil disqualification statute, in the case of State ex rel. Peery v. District Court of
the Fourth Judicial District, petition for Mandamus filed, No. 10853, Sup. Ct. of
Mont., Sept. 8, 1964.
'CAL. PEN. CODE § 261: "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a
female not the wife of the perpetrator, under either of the following circumstances:
1. Where the female is under the age of eighteen years. . .. " Montana has sub-
stantially the same statute. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-4101. See note
33, infra, for the California statute dealing with the punishment for the offense of
statutory rape. The defendant in the instant case had sexual intercourse with a
girl seventeen years and nine months of age and was convicted of a misdemeanor
under these statutes. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are hereinafter cited R.C.M.
'See discussion and extensive annotation in 44 Am. Jur. Rape § 41 (1942). Regina v.
Prince, 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 13 Eng. Rep. 385 (1875), was the first case to promulgate
this rule and is heavily relied on by modern cases.
'Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896); State v. Wade, 224
N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944).
'State v. Duncan, 82 Mont. 170, 184, 266 Pac. 400 (1928); State v. Reid, 127 Mont.
552, 562, 267 P.2d 986 (1954). Neither case involved a defense of mistake as to the
age of the prosecutrix. The court in the Reid case quoted the following passage from
the Duncan case as expressing the law on the subject:
The consent of the female, the lack of knowledge of her age, or even her
misrepresentation as to her age . . . are all immaterial matters; a conviction
depends solely upon proof of intercourse and nonage, and if a man indulge in
promiscuity with strange women he has only himself to blame if it later develops
that he has unwittingly committed the crime of rape. Such is the law as
declared by the lawmaking body of this state, and the province of the courts
is to enforce the law as they find it.
The court in United States v. Red Wolf, 172 F. Supp. 168 (D. Mont. 1959), cited
these cases as expressing the Montana law on the subject; but the court held that
federal, not Montana, law was controlling.
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